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that state competition benefits shareholders.
6  Roberta Romano has similarly argued
that state competition ensures that corporate law maximizes shareholder wealth.
7
Indeed, Professor Romano labels the federalist structure of corporate law “the genius
8
Several years ago one of us pursued the route suggested by Cary and
developed an analysis of the problems produced by state competition.
9  That analysis
suggested that, with respect to a set of important corporate issues, state competition is
unlikely to serve shareholder wealth maximization.
10  Rather, the analysis suggested
that states might have an incentive to provide rules that are preferred by managers and
controllers---and that on these issues the rules preferred by managers and controllers
may well be different from what’s beneficial to shareholders.
Building on that analysis, we continue in this Article to examine the
contention, articulated by Cary, that there are serious problems with state competition.
Our analysis suggests that state competition suffers from important structural
problems, and that competition among states is therefore likely to produce troubling
                                                                
6 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 Del. J.Corp. L. 540, 546 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
in Corporate Law, 26 J.L.& Ec. 395, 398 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom”
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L.
Rev.  913 (1982); see generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 1--40 (1991).
7 See Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover
Statutes, 61 Fordham L.Rev. 843, 856 (1993); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709, 717 (1987); cf. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:
A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998).
8 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 1 (1993).
9 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L.Rev. 1435 (1992).
10 Moreover, state competition for corporate charters might lead to inefficiencies when the
interests of not only shareholders but also third parties are implicated by a legal rule.  See id. at
1485--1495.  The present discussion will focus on shareholder wealth.3
results with respect to some critical aspects of corporate law.  Cary carefully
examined several corporate law issues, such as proxy contests, de facto mergers,
fairness in parent-subsidiary transactions, and directors’ duty of care, all hot issues in
the 1960s.  We will discuss the issues involved in the state competition debate
through the lens of takeover regulation, perhaps the most important issue in corporate
law in the last two decades.
11  We use takeover law as a case study of the
shortcomings of state competition.
Our analysis is organized as follows.  Part I will argue that there are strong
theoretical reasons to believe that states will have incentives to produce a body of
takeover law that excessively protects incumbent managers and restricts hostile
takeovers.  Because managers play a key role in incorporation decisions, states
(especially ones with a large number of already incorporated companies, such as
Delaware) will give substantial weight to satisfying managers’ preferences.  To be
sure, in some areas of corporate law, because managers’ and shareholders’ interests
are sufficiently aligned due to various market forces, the rules that managers would
like states to adopt are those that maximize shareholder value.  But, we argue, in the
                                                                
11  A parallel debate has been taking place concerning competition among jurisdictions in
the international sphere.  Some commentators believe that this form of competition is generally
beneficial, see, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998); Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S.Cal.L.Rev. 903 (1998); Stephen
Choi & Andrew Guzman, National Law, International Money: Regulation in a Global Market, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1855 (1997).  Others predict harmful effects resulting from such competition,
see, e.g., Merritt Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment (unpublished paper); Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing
Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498 (1997).  While our paper will
focus on competition among states, the analysis also has implications for international
competition among jurisdictions.  For reasons explained in Bebchuk, supra, at 1507-08,
international competition and state competition have similar structural problems.  Thus, the4
area of takeovers, this is unlikely to be the case.  Because of the value that managers
might place on their independence, managers might prefer rules that excessively
restrict takeovers notwithstanding that such rules might somewhat reduce share value
and make it somewhat more difficult for them to acquire other companies when they
wear the acquirers’ hat.
  Part II analyzes the development of state takeover law and argues that it is
consistent with the above theoretical analysis.  States have developed a substantial
body of rules, including both antitakeover statutes and judicial decisions permitting
the use of defensive tactics, that make takeovers more difficult.  We suggest that these
rules are quite likely to excessively protect managers.  To start with, we show that the
extent to which these rules restrict takeovers has little support in the policy literature
on takeovers.  States’ relentless effort to come up with new antitakeover statutes
seems to be motivated more by a desire to make takeovers more difficult than by an
attempt to address in a cost-effective way some valid policy concerns.  And the
latitude that states have given to defensive tactics has surpassed what even the
strongest supporters of defensive tactics have advocated.  Furthermore, states have
provided managers with more antitakeover protections than shareholders seemed to
have been willing to give them.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, states have
elected to proceed in a way that imposed antitakeover protections without giving them
much choice or say.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
implication of our analysis is that international competition would not work well with regard  to
rules governing takeovers.5
Our analysis of Delaware takeover law highlights the fact  that its rules
governing defensive tactics seem to be characterized by unnecessary ambiguity and
unpredictability resulting in frequent litigation.  While this aspect of Delaware law
benefits the interests of the Delaware bar, which might be of importance to Delaware,
it is difficult to see how shareholders are benefited by the excessive unpredictability
and vagueness of its rules.  Finally, our analysis of state takeover law ends in a
comparison of it to the body of takeover law produced by the British City Code which
is the product of self-regulation by a body that might well have stronger incentives to
care about shareholder interests than do states.  In sharp contrast to what state
takeover law does, the British City Code severely restricts defensive tactics by
incumbents, restricts bidders only to an extent that seems to serve some valid policy
concerns, and overall regulates takeovers through rules that are much clearer and
predictable in application.
Part III discusses the inability of state competition advocates to square their
position with  their own view that state takeover law, including Delaware’s,
excessively protects incumbent managers and excessively discourages bidders.
Indeed some of the fiercest critics of impediments to takeovers, which are as much a
product of state competition for corporate charters as any other aspect of corporate
law, are also the leading state competition advocates.  We conclude by expressing our
belief that state competition advocates would be  well-advised to reconsider their
position.  Pro-state competition scholars’ own criticisms of state takeover law, many
of which we share, demand no less.6
I.  THE THEORY OF TAKEOVER LAW UNDER STATE COMPETITION
As one of us has argued, state competition might have virtues with respect to
some corporate law questions but perform badly with respect to others.
12  According
to that analysis, the issues with respect to which state competition will work poorly
are: (i) issues that are “significantly redistributive” (in that their effect on managers’
or controlling shareholders’ private interests is not insignificant relative to their effect
on shareholder value), (ii) issues that directly affect the strength of market discipline,
and (iii) issues that implicate the interests of not only shareholders and managers but
also third parties.  In this Article, we will focus our attention on one very important
area of corporate law: the rules governing takeovers.  The argument will be that states
have an incentive to design takeover law that is more restrictive on bidders and more
protective of managers than is in shareholders’ interests.
A.  The Importance of Managers
A state’s takeover law will apply to companies incorporated in that state who
become takeover targets.  These companies have, almost by definition, sufficient
dispersion of shares such that managers have some measure of “de facto” control.
Let us begin by explaining why states, in particular Delaware, will care about
managers’ preferences.  The reason for this is simple:  managers play a pivotal role in
                                                                
12     See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.REV. 1435 (1992).  7
determining whether a company reincorporates to another state.
13  If a state wishes to
maximize the number of companies that are incorporated there---the starting
assumption of the “race to the top”/“race to the bottom” debate---the state will take an
interest in both initial incorporation decisions and subsequent reincorporation
decisions.
Consider Delaware, which  has a very large number of companies already
incorporated there.  It is critically important to Delaware’s continued success, and any
state in a similar situation, that it  retain companies already chartered there.  The
potential loss by Delaware of chartered companies through reincorporation, for any
given period of time, is greater than the potential gain from initial incorporations.
While the number of initial incorporations in any given year is likely to be fairly
limited, the number of companies that Delaware could potentially lose through
reincorporation, i.e. the companies already chartered there, is significant.  Moreover,
Delaware will not only be interested in preventing its companies from reincorporating
to another state, but inducing companies chartered elsewhere to move to Delaware.
14
For these reasons, it would not be surprising if Delaware’s corporate law catered, to a
                                                                
13 A company cannot reincorporate without the company’s managers deciding to bring a
reincorporation proposal to a shareholder vote.  See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law s 10.2.4 at
416--17 (1986).  Moreover, managers in companies with widely dispersed ownership of shares
can have significant influence over the outcome of a shareholder vote through control of the
voting process.
14 Delaware has been very successful in the market for reincorporations.  See  Roberta
Romano, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 265-78 (finding that
82% of all reincorporating companies between 1960 and 1982 switched to Delaware); see also
Demetrio Kaouris, Is Delaware a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 Del. J.Corp. L. 965, 1011 (1995)
(finding that out of 255 surveyed companies that changed their corporate domicile between 1982
and 1994, 89% reincorporated to Delaware).8
significant extent, to the preferences, whatever those preferences may be, of
managers.
Indeed, the incentive of states, which do not have a large number of chartered
companies, to provide shareholder wealth-maximizing rules, when these harm
managerial interests, is not nearly as strong as one might think.  First of all, by
providing rules preferred by shareholders the state will place itself at a disadvantage
in the market for reincorporations with respect to the companies that are currently
chartered there and to those that might otherwise consider reincorporating to that
state.
But wouldn’t a state that provided rules beneficial to shareholders attract more
initial incorporations as a result?   Not necessarily.  It is questionable the extent to
which companies initially incorporating in a state with shareholder wealth-
maximizing rules, when those rules differ from the ones preferred by managers,
would benefit from them in the form of a higher price for securities sold in an initial
public offering.  Buyers of securities in a company initially incorporated in such a
state might anticipate that if the state did ever enjoy a significant number of chartered
companies, the state will then have a powerful incentive, much as Delaware does, to
craft its law so as to satisfy managerial preferences.  Even if the state were judged
unlikely to make such a mid-stream change in its law, a similar shareholder wealth-
decreasing result might nevertheless be anticipated due to the ability of managers to
reincorporate the company, at a later point in time, in a state that does have rules to
the liking of the managers.9
But merely concluding that states, and in particular Delaware, care a great deal
about managers’ preferences does not by itself imply that managers’ and
shareholders’ interests are likely to systematically diverge.  This was perhaps the
most underdeveloped aspect of Cary’s position.  Pro-state competition scholars are
quick to argue that state competition for corporate charters works well because, due to
market incentives, managers want to do what is in the interests of shareholders.
15
Below we explain why these market incentives may often be insufficient to induce
managers to prefer takeover rules that are more restrictive than what would be
optimal for shareholders.
B.  Managers’ Preferred Takeover Law
1.  Market Incentives
At first glance one might reason as follows: Since managers want to keep their
jobs and independence, they will surely want to prevent any takeover that does not
receive their approval.  It is not possible to jump to this conclusion, however, because
managers also care about share value for several widely noted reasons.  And to the
extent that restrictive takeover law would reduce shareholder value, they might prefer
a state that opts for a more permissive approach.
Among the potential reasons why managers might have a strong interest in
maximizing share value, we address two of the main ones.  First, unnecessarily low
                                                                
15 See, e.g., Roberto Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993); Frank H.
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991); Ralph K.10
share value can lead to an increased likelihood of takeover.  The greater the difference
between a share’s value and what it could be worth if managers were acting in
shareholders’ interests, the more profitable, ceteris paribus, a takeover will be, and
hence, the more likely it is that one will occur.  Second, managers’ compensation and
wealth are often tied, at least to a certain extent, to a share’s price through share
options and share holdings.  Insofar as managers are shareholders themselves, they
will have an incentive to make decisions that reflect the interests of shareholders.
As will be explained, however, these two market constraints are unlikely to be
sufficient, in a number of cases, to cause managers to prefer a permissive takeover
legal regime.
2.  The Effect of Restrictive Takeover Law on Managers’ Interests
As noted, pro-state competition theorists argue that the threat of a takeover
will cause managers to seek the legal arrangement that would be beneficial to
shareholders.  The argument is roughly as follows.  Suppose there are two legal
arrangements and one produces higher shareholder value compared with the other
one.  In that case, managers will prefer the regime which maximizes shareholder
value, because that arrangement also reduces the probability of a takeover.  Higher
share value makes takeovers more costly and, as a result, less likely.
But let us further suppose that of the two regimes, A is the optimal takeover
regime from the perspective of shareholders while B is a somewhat more restrictive
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.Legal
Studies 251 (1977).11
arrangement.  Since A is the optimal arrangement, share value would be, by
definition, lower under regime B.  But that does not necessarily mean that the
likelihood of a takeover would be increased by B.  To be sure, with a lower share
value, a takeover at the same price would be more profitable.  But if B makes it
sufficiently more difficult to do a takeover, then the likelihood of a hostile takeover
would be smaller despite the lower share price.
It is important to note that making a hostile takeover overall more difficult can
benefit managers in two ways.  First, they might be able to use the protective
arrangement to prevent a takeover altogether, a valuable option since they could then
retain all the private benefits of control that come with independence (including not
losing their jobs).  Alternatively, they can use their increased ability to resist
takeovers so as to benefit themselves in any takeover, perhaps by maximizing the side
payments they receive from an acquirer in a negotiated acquisition.
However, one might raise the interest of managers in increasing share value
because of their stock options and stock holdings.  But the above-mentioned two
effects, which are potentially quite important to managers, can easily dominate this
interest.  Consider managers who now have, say, 3% of the company’s stock and
enjoy substantial private benefits of control.
16  If a legal arrangement would
substantially reduce the likelihood of their losing these private benefits of control,
                                                                
16 The correlation between managerial pay and performance has been found to be weak.
See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives,
98 J. Pol. Econ. 225, 237 (1990); CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How,
Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1990, at 138.12
then that might well be more important to them than avoiding some reduction in the
value of their existing holdings.
17
3.  Managers’ Interests in Acquiring other Companies
Thus far, we have explained why managers of a Delaware company might
prefer that, if their company were to become a target, they enjoy the protection of a
legal regime that restricted takeovers more than is optimal from the perspective  of
shareholders.  But it might be said that this does not imply that they would prefer that
Delaware have rules that inefficiently restricted takeovers, for such rules would apply
to them regardless of whether their company becomes a target.  Such rules may also
apply to companies that they will want to acquire in the future.  One might posit that
this creates a countervailing consideration.
18  Because managers can be on both sides
of a takeover, so to speak, they will not favor a takeover law that is too restrictive.
But this symmetry does not exist.  For several reasons, managers of a
Delaware company will likely care more about how Delaware’s takeover rules would
affect them should their company become a target, than they would about the impact
of Delaware’s takeover law should they wish to acquire other companies.
First of all, while Delaware law would surely affect them if they become an
acquisition target, Delaware law may or may not affect them should they want to
acquire another company.
  It will affect them if they want to buy another company
                                                                
17 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Col. L.Rev. 1461, 1510
(1989) (concluding that managerial interests are strongest when their jobs are implicated, thereby
creating an incentive for states to adopt rules that enable managers to keep their positions).
18  See Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 59-60 (1993).13
that is incorporated in Delaware with dispersed ownership, but it will not affect them
if they go after a company with a controlling shareholder, a company that is closely
held, or a company with dispersed ownership that is incorporated elsewhere.
19
Second, even assuming that Delaware takeover law would apply each time
they go after a target, there is an asymmetry in the stakes to managers.  It very well
might be extremely important to them to retain their own positions and private
benefits of control---here the personal stakes of managers could be quite substantial.
In contrast, it is unlikely to be as important to them to weaken the power of the
managers of a company with dispersed ownership which they might wish to acquire.
Their personal interests are not implicated to anywhere near the same degree; at most
they will have to choose different acquisition targets or to pay a higher acquisition
price (including any side payments to the target’s managers).  This asymmetry is
evidenced by the fact that corporations are the primary lobby responsible for the
passage of antitakeover legislation,
20 even though this legislation will presumably
impede their own future acquisitions of corporations falling under the legislation’s
ambit.
                                                                
19 In other words, a manager’s decision of where to (re)incorporate has no effect on the
takeover law governing potential acquisitions.   Foregoing (re)incorporating in a state with
antitakeover defenses does not increase the probability that a potential target will do the same.14
C.  Conclusion
The bottom line of the preceding analysis is that states competing for corporate
charters---and in particular Delaware which is presumably striving to maintain its
dominant role in this market---have an incentive to provide a body of law that makes
takeovers more difficult regardless of whether this is in the interests of shareholders.
We now turn to take a look at Delaware’s takeover law and reflect on whether it’s
consistent with our theoretical conclusions.
II.  REFLECTIONS ON STATE TAKEOVER LAW
We start with a qualification---what we provide in this Part is not a full
analysis and evaluation of the development of state takeover law in the last twenty-
five years.  This would be too large an undertaking.  The literature on takeovers is
voluminous.  What we do is to offer a set of observations on the body of takeover law
that Delaware and other states have produced.  Our observations are consistent with
the preceding theoretical analysis which indicated that state competition is unlikely to
produce a body of takeover law that is optimal from the viewpoint of shareholders.
A.  The Pro-Management Tilt of State Takeover Law
1.  How States Worked To Make Takeovers More Difficult
                                                                                                                                                                                                
20 See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715, 749--
50 (1998); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111,
121--22 (1987).15
States have worked hard, and quite successfully, to make takeovers more difficult.
State takeover law consists of a substantial body of rules---both statutory and judge-
made that significantly impedes hostile takeovers and shields incumbent managers.
The fruits of these efforts are reflected in both rules governing bidders and those
governing the use of defensive tactics.  As we will explain, it is the rules concerning
defensive tactics that have erected the most important impediments.  But we will also
analyze the rules restricting the activity of bidders both for the sake of completeness
and because they also reflect, though less dramatically, the tendency of states to
substantially restrict takeovers.
(i)  Rules Restricting Bidders
One popular way among states of protecting managers from unwanted
takeovers is restricting what bidders are able to do.  While the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
21 and the Securities Act of 1933
22 regulate various aspects of tender
offers, the most important source of restrictions on the activities of bidders have
come, by and large, from state antitakeover legislation.  Over a twenty-five year
period, there have been several waves of state antitakeover statutes, easily making
passage of antitakeover legislation one of the top priorities of states in the corporate
law area.  Numerous states over the years have enacted antitakeover statutes imposing
a bewildering array of requirements on bidders.
                                                                
21  The Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 impose various
disclosure and procedural requirements on cash tender offers.
22  If a portion of the consideration for the target company is securities of the bidder, the
Securities Act of 1933 will often be applicable.16
The first state takeover statute was enacted by Virginia in 1968.
23  Over the
next thirteen years, thirty-six states followed Virginia’s lead.
24  These statutes often
imposed disclosure requirements on bidders as well as---more burdensomely---
requiring administrative approval for a bid to proceed.  After the first wave of
statutes’ constitutionality was called into serious question,
25 states enacted a new set
of antitakeover statutes.
So-called second-generation antitakeover statutes spread rapidly.
26  There were
several types of second-generation antitakeover statutes.  “Control share acquisition”
statutes typically require a shareholder vote approving an “acquisition of control” by a
party.  Other states adopted “fair price”  statutes which prohibit a “second-step”
merger
27 between the bidder and the target company unless a supermajority
shareholder vote approves the merger or the bidder provides a “fair price,” as defined
by the statute, for the remaining shares.  In a somewhat similar vein, states also
adopted “redemption rights” statutes, which provide minority shareholders the right to
sell to the bidder shares for their “fair value,” again a price determined by statute.
Some states, including Delaware, adopted a “business combination” statute
prohibiting bidders from engaging in certain business combinations with an acquired
                                                                
23  Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, Va. Code ss 13.1-528. 13.1-541.
24  See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 225, 234 (1985)
25  Edgar v. Mite, 457 U.S. 624 (1981).
26  While we refer to five different types of statutes as second-generation statutes, it is worth
pointing out for purposes of clarity that some commentators have divided these statutes into
several different generations.
27  A “second-step” merger is a merger between a corporation and a shareholder holding a
significant percentage of the corporation’s stock.17
company for a specified period of time.
28  Thirty-seven states adopted second-
generation antitakeover statutes within a mere eight years of the MITE decision.
29
The hard work of states ultimately paid off.  They had fashioned antitakeover statutes
that were likely to pass constitutional muster.
30
The states were still not satisfied.  Yet another type of antitakeover statute, the
so-called “constituency statute,” has become popular among states.  The focus of
these statutes, however, is somewhat different than the others.  They are concerned
with what target management can legally do in frustrating an unwanted bid, not on
what bidders can do.   It is to this central issue that we now turn.
(ii)  Rules Governing Defensive Tactics
The most important impediment to takeovers today is the wide latitude given
to managers to engage in defensive tactics, especially the ability to hide behind a
poison pill.
31  Perhaps the most critical development creating this managerial power
                                                                
28  See generally Jesse Choper, John Coffee, and Ronald Gilson, Cases and Materials on
Corporations   1054-1057 (1995) (4th ed.)
29 Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S.Cal. L.Rev. at 752-53.
30  See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,  481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding  Indiana’s second
generation antitakeover statute against a dormant commerce clause challenge).
31  The Chief Economist for the Securities and Exchange Commission defined a poison pill
as:
[A]ny financial device that when triggered by a particular action (e.g. merging a target’s assets or
acquiring more than some specified amount of the target’s common stock), results in one or a
combination of the following:
(1)  the acquirer is forced to purchase securities from the shareholders of the target firm at
prices equal to or exceeding their market value
(2)  security holders of the target firm gain rights to exchange stock of the target firm for
a combination of cash and securities from the target firm exceeding that of the
surrendered stock (acquirer is generally excluded from this exchange)18
was the approval by the Delaware courts of poison pills put in place by
management.
32  After it became clear that managers had the power to erect poison pill
defenses, the key question became (and continues to be): When would managers be
forced to dismantle them in a takeover contest?  Delaware law has gradually evolved
so as to allow directors, consistent with their fiduciary obligations to shareholders, to
“just say no” to potential bidders with their poison pill defenses in place.
Many states have adopted “constituency statutes” that enable directors to
consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees and local
communities, in exercising their authority.
33  Arguably this provides managers with
an even greater ability to formulate a legally acceptable reason not to dismantle a
poison pill or refrain from whatever other defense maneuvers they might wish to
engage in.  It is worth noting that even though Delaware does not have a
“constituency statute” its case law has long permitted managers in evaluating and
responding to a hostile takeover to consider its “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(3)  the security holders of the target firm gain rights to purchase securities from the
target form at prices below market value (acquirer is generally excluded)
(4)  the acquirer must sell securities of the acquiring entity at prices below market value
to security holders of the target firm
(5)  the acquirer loses substantial voting power of his or her shares relative to other
security holders of the target firm.
Office of the Chief Economist, The Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders
1, 6-7 (Oct. 23, 1986).
32  The use of the poison pill to ward of a potential bidder was first approved by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), a case
which we will discuss in Part II(A)(2)(ii).
33  Thirty-one states have adopted “constituency statutes” since 1986.  See Jesse Choper,
John Coffee, and Ronald Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1057 (1995) (4th ed.).19
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally).”
34
(iii)  The Corporate Fortress
  Considering the cumulative effect of the restrictions states have placed on the
activities of bidders as well as managers’ ability to erect and maintain antitakeover
defenses, especially the poison pill, it is obvious to even the most casual observer that
managers have substantial power to block takeovers.  Companies are today
surrounded by high walls that can be very costly for bidders to breach against a
determined target management.  As a result of these legal developments,  the impact
on the operation of the market for corporate control has been far-reaching.
As one would expect, states have varied somewhat in how far they have gone
in this direction. As pro-state competition scholars have emphasized, Delaware,
despite offering managers substantial protection against unwanted acquisitions, has
not fortified the corporate castle as much as other states have.  But for our purposes,
what is important is not the differences among states, which are, on the whole, small
compared to the long road toward restricting takeovers that almost all states have
traveled.  What is important is the aggregate product of state competition and how
that differs from the body of rules that would maximize shareholder wealth.
Accordingly, we now offer some observations on why the impediments to takeovers
that states have so vigorously created are excessive.
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2.  The Weak Policy Basis for State Antitakeover Law
Being academics, we start with the observation that the powerful antitakeover
position taken by Delaware does not appear to have a strong basis in the extensive
literature examining the desirability of different types of takeover regulation from the
perspective of shareholders.  Before proceeding, we want to emphasize that this is just
one observation and not the basis for our view that Delaware has gone too far.  Of
course, the best arrangement could, in fact, be one that receives little support in
academic circles.  Even if powerful antitakeover protections are justified, we will
argue in  subsections (3) and (4) below that they should have been afforded to
managers in a manner much different than they were.  But a natural place to begin the
analysis is to see how Delaware’s antitakeover position has fared in policy debates.
(i)  Rules Restricting Bidders
In this Section we will examine the policy basis for the arrangements
introduced by state antitakeover statutes.  As we have seen, while these statutes have
made takeovers more difficult, their impeding effect is likely less than that of the
rules governing defensive tactics.  Our problem with takeover statutes, however, is
not so much with the magnitude of the difficulties they pose for takeovers.  Instead, as
explained below, our problem is that these statutes seemed to have been created to a
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(stressing this language in Unocal)21
large extent for the purpose of making takeovers more difficult rather than to address
legitimate policy concerns.
We start with the observation that states have consistently come up with very
different types of antitakeover statutes, focussing on various issues and using different
techniques.  When a particular type of statute was found to be constitutionally suspect
or to provide little impediment to takeovers, they simply went back to the drawing
board and adopted another type of statute.  The first generation focussed on the tender
offer process, a similar focus to that of the Williams Act.  When these statutes’
constitutionally were called into question in MITE, states simply went to the drawing
board having in mind  that a statute regulating a company’s internal affairs would
likely be permissible under the decision’s rationale.  They tried then to use this
opening to impede takeovers, without interfering in the takeover process directly, by
altering the powers that an acquirer would have following a takeover.  When various
second-generation statutes---many of which, as explained below, have a plausible
policy rationale---were upheld against constitutional challenges but did not seem to
pose a substantial impediment to tender offers shareholders would want to accept,
states went back to work.  They came up with a new and different set of statutes.  The
one common denominator to all the antitakeover statutes is that they all seek to make
takeovers, in one way or another, more difficult.
As has already been mentioned, for some second-generation statutes one could
at least find a legitimate policy rationale: the need to address the pressure-to-tender
problem that shareholders sometimes confront when considering a tender offer.  The
pressure-to-tender problem results from shareholders’ incentive to tender their shares22
to a bidder out of fear of ending up with low-value minority shares in the event that
other shareholders tender and the offer succeeds.  Shareholders will have this
incentive even if they all reach the conclusion that their shares would be worth more
if the tender offer did not succeed.
35
One type of second-generation statute that some states adopted, referred to
earlier, is the “control share acquisition” statute.  This statute could conceivably be
justified as addressing the pressure-to-tender problem as it required shareholders to
vote on whether a bidder can acquire control of a company.  Such a vote might
prevent a coercive offer from proceeding and, thus, benefit shareholders.
36  This type
of statute provides shareholders with direct input as to whether an acquisition should
proceed.  In sharp contrast, many of the more formidable defensive tactics, as we
shall see, are so potent precisely because they prevent shareholders from ever
deciding for themselves the merits of a tender offer.
37
Another type of second-generation statute that addressed the pressure to tender
problem is the “redemption rights” statute.   This statute typically ensures that the
post-tender offer value of minority shares will not fall below the offer price.  This
again would eliminate the pressure to tender.  Tender offers that shareholders do not
find attractive would not be able to succeed through a bidder exploiting a
                                                                
35  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
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Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 336-37 (1974).
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37  See infra Part II(A)(3)-(4).23
shareholder’s pressure to tender for fear of being stuck with less valuable minority
shares.
So it is fair to say that many second-generation antitakeover statutes responded
to a concern that the literature had identified as important.  One might have thought
that states would rest content with their “control share acquisition” or “redemption
rights” statutes.  To the extent that  the pressure-to-tender problem was effectively
addressed by these statutes, the only tender offers that would be able to succeed are
the ones shareholders want.  Moreover, while these second-generation statutes would
arguably frustrate all offers shareholders would not want to succeed, they probably
would not substantially deter offers shareholders would want to take.
38  But states did
not stop here.  Tellingly, states continued to add more restrictions on  bidders which
do not seem designed to address specific concerns over the operation of the takeover
process.
Take, for example, the “business combination” statutes.  Delaware has one,
39
along with thirty other states.
40  These statutes typically restrict a successful bidder’s
ability to engage in a wide range of transactions with an acquired company, such as
mergers, liquidations, sales of assets and stock issuances.
41  These statutes might also
prevent some takeovers which shareholders would want.  They could conceivably
reduce the potential efficiency gains resulting from the bidder acquiring control to the
                                                                
38  See Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions
553-558 (1995) (supplement)
39  Del. Gen. Corp. Law s 203.
40  See Jesse Choper, John Coffee, and Ronald Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations
1055 (1995) (4th ed.)
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extent that those gains would require, say, effecting a merger between the bidder and
the target.
Some observers argue that the costs imposed on bidders by Delaware’s
statute, and similar statutes, are not all that large and thus, by
themselves, should not greatly curtail takeovers.
42  But our point does not depend on
how large the costs are.  Assuming that just having fewer hostile takeovers is not an
end in itself, these statutes are not an effective instrument for addressing any valid
concern.  The only justification that could be given for these statutes is that, by
defending minority shares in the aftermath of a takeover, they prevent coercion and
unequal treatment of shareholders.  A “control share acquisition” statute or a
“redemption rights” statute would clearly be superior in accomplishing these goals.  A
state could fulfill these goals in a complete way without preventing efficient
takeovers.  In contrast, “business combination” statutes carry the potential cost of
preventing some desirable acquisition offers.
Reviewing what states have done legislatively in restricting bidders causes one
to suspect that states really care about making takeovers more difficult rather than
merely eliminating particular distortions in the takeover process.  This impression is
powerfully reinforced by looking at state rules governing defensive tactics.  We now
turn to this subject.
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(ii)  Rules Governing Defensive Tactics
The use of defensive tactics by managers raises an obvious conflict of interest
problem.  There is no question that allowing managerial discretion to use defensive
tactics entails costs.  This has led some commentators to support a ban on defensive
tactics.  While other commentators have supported the use of some tactics to address
particular threats and distortions, they did not want managers, given the severe
conflict of interest problem, to be granted an open-ended license.  But this is the
direction in which state laws have moved.
The discussion in this Section will focus on the most powerful impediment to
takeovers---the ability of managers, at least in a wide range of circumstances, to “just
say no” to potential bidders while keeping in place a poison pill defense.  There can
be no question that the use of defensive tactics by managers presents a serious
problem, because of the inherent conflict of interest faced by managers in the
takeover context.  After all, managers’ private interests, including their very jobs, are
directly implicated.  There is always the danger that managers will oppose a
shareholder value-enhancing offer in order to maintain their corporation’s
independence.  As the Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, there is
always the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
43
There is a large body of literature that argues that managers should be
completely prohibited from engaging in defensive tactics---a literature which includes26
contributions by leading advocates of state competition.
44  Those who oppose
defensive tactics do not ignore the possibility that abusive takeover tactics might
result in a bad takeover outcome.  For example, there is the concern, discussed earlier,
that shareholders will be pressured-to-tender due to the fear of being left holding
minority shares with a value lower than the bid price.
45  But those who oppose
defensive tactics can point to legal arrangements that would address such problems.
The pressure to tender problem, for example, can often be resolved by having a
shareholder vote on a tender offer.
46  There is no need, on this view, to use the costly
remedy of giving managers the power to use defensive tactics and, thus, to have some
veto power over acquisitions.
While both of us share the above view, some commentators favor giving
managers power to use defensive tactics in order to address abusive takeover tactics.
For instance, Reinier Kraakman and Ronald Gilson, in trying to explain and
rationalize Delaware’s early cases applying Unocal’s proportionality test, suggested
that defensive tactics, including retaining the pill in the face of a hostile tender offer,
should pass judicial review insofar as they address two particular threats: so-called
structural and substantive coercion.
47  They argued that a pill should be retained only
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44 See generally Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory,  Evidence and
Regulation, 9 Yale J. on Reg. 119 (1992); Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819 (1981); Frank H.
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45   See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695 (1985).
46 Id. at 1747-52.
47 See Ronald Gilson  and Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law.  247 (1989).27
if either: (i) the offer is structured in a coercive way, or (ii) the managers can make
some showing (by, say, relying on an investment banker’s opinion) that the
independent value of the target significantly exceeds the offer consideration.  The
point worth emphasizing is that even commentators who endorse the use of defensive
tactics to address abusive takeovers do not wish that managers have an open-ended,
unlimited power to “just say no.”
It is interesting to note that even Martin Lipton, inventor of the pill and
champion of takeover defenses, writing in the 1980s did not go so far as to argue that
managers should always have the ability to frustrate hostile tender offers.  In a 1987
article, Lipton justified defensive tactics by pointing to a list of particular takeover
abuses, each of which he discusses at length.
48  He does not at any point argue that
managers should be allowed to “just say no” when the identified abuses are not
present.
But the Delaware courts have left the reasoning of all these commentators,
even those sympathetic to some types of defensive tactics, far behind, instead
endorsing a much more expansive license for managerial use of poison pills and “just
49  This was done in stages.  Initially, Delaware law seemed to be willing to
allow tactics only in response to particular well-defined threats.  But later on, without
much in terms of providing explicit justification, Delaware went well beyond this.
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Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).  That approach entails allowing
antitakeover devices in the case of coercive behavior by the bidder.
48 See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Financial Corporatism,  136 U.
PA. L.Rev. 1 (1987).
49 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
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The first seminal Delaware cases, decided in the mid-1980s, which dealt with
managers’ ability to use defensive tactics to defeat hostile tender offers, were Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
50 and Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc.
51  In both cases,
the Delaware Supreme Court was careful to both examine the particular threat to
shareholders that would have existed without managerial use of the defensive tactic in
question and whether the defensive tactic that was used addressed that particular
threat.  Only then did the court conclude that the use of the defensive tactic was
appropriate.  In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court
reviewed a selective self-tender offer by a target corporation that was being offered as
a way of defeating a hostile tender offer.  In explaining why the target management
had not violated their fiduciary duties to shareholders, the court repeatedly
emphasized the fact that the board reasonably believed that the hostile tender offer
was a “grossly inadequate two-tier coercive tender offer” and that the self-tender offer
was “reasonably related to the threats posed.”
52  In Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc.
 ,
the Delaware Supreme Court approved the use of another defensive tactic by
managers: the erection of a poison pill defense.  The court relied on the fact that the
plan was mild and would therefore not deter bidders.  Rather, the poison pill at issue
merely provided reasonable protection against a coercive two-tier tender offer.
53
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Moreover, the court pointed out that once a bidder did arrive on the scene, a decision
not to dismantle the pill at that time would be reviewable by the Delaware judiciary.
54
After these decisions, the Chancery Court began to develop a jurisprudence
limiting the use of defensive tactics so as to protect shareholders not only from
coercive hostile tender offers but also from managerial abuse of these tactics. For
example, in AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,
55 the Chancery Court
concluded that the target board’s selective self-tender offer was itself coercive and,
therefore, not reasonable.
56  The Chancery Court followed this up with its decision in
City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc.
57  There, the court forced a target board to
redeem its poison pill in the face of a non-coercive tender offer the board believed
was too low.
58  Indeed, in the course of its analysis, the court approvingly cited Gilson
and Kraakman’s interpretation of the Unocal standard.
59  Later that same year, the
Delaware Chancery Court in another case forced a target board to redeem its poison
pill in the face of a noncoercive tender offer.
60   Unfortunately, this searching inquiry
of managerial use of defensive tactics, and whether shareholders were being  well-
served by them, was not to last.
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57  551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
58  The Chancery Court forcefully explained that “To acknowledge that directors may
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Perhaps the key turning point in creating a much more expansive license for
managerial use of defensive tactics was the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
several years later in Paramount v. Time,
61 wherein the court went out of its way to
explicitly disavow the approach of the Chancery Court in Interco.
62  The Delaware
Supreme Court stressed that the all-cash, all-shares tender offer for Time by
Paramount threatened the target management’s business plan (here, merging with
Warner)---a threat it found to be legally cognizable.
63  In contrast to what one might
have thought from Unocal and Moran, and the Chancery Court cases building on their
analysis, the Time  court made very clear that the use of defensive tactics are not
limited to situations where the tender offer is coercive---which Paramount’s offer
clearly was not---or when management has particular, defensible reasons to believe
the offer is inadequate.
64  The potential discretion this line of reasoning provides
managers is sweeping.
Until this decision, Delaware was arguably in line with those commentators,
such as Professors Kraakman and Gilson, who endorsed defensive tactics in response
to particular, well-defined threats.
65  Beginning with Paramount v. Time, Delaware
courts have, however, increasingly tolerated, although this is not much acknowledged,
the open-ended use by managers of defensive tactics far more drastic than the one at
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issue in Moran, without requiring, in any meaningful way, a showing of structural or
substantive coercion.
66
This important leap was made by the Delaware courts without much
justification.  This development also had little support in the literature, at that time or
since.  Now it is always possible that Delaware law, notwithstanding the lack of
articulated policy justifications, is in fact the legal regime that is beneficial to
shareholders and reflects what shareholders want.  In the end, what’s important is not
what some academics believe but what actually serves the interests of shareholders.
And this brings us to our next two critical observations: that Delaware, as well
as other states, has adopted stronger antitakeover protections than those shareholders
at the time were willing to voluntarily provide; and that states have imposed these
arrangements on shareholders in a way that left them with little choice or say.
3.  States Granted to Managers What Shareholders Were Not Willing to Give
It is worthwhile to stress that impediments to takeovers, to the extent that they
are favored by shareholders, can be adopted through charter provisions.  In the late
1970s and early 1980s managers did indeed push for various antitakeover charter
amendments.
67  But it became increasingly clear that informed shareholders were
                                                                
66  In Unitrin, Inc. v. American Corp., 651 A ,2d 1361 (Del. 1995), for instance, the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld a target corporation’s repurchase of its stock, which was
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67 See Ronald Gilson, The Case  Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural
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willing to vote only for “mild” antitakeover arrangements---ones aimed at addressing
the pressure-to-tender problem but not going much beyond this.
68
Already in the 1980s, Roberta Romano described how managers were
successful in getting antitakeover protections from states more severe than those they
could receive from shareholders.
69  If this was true then it has become even more so
since.  The protections from takeovers which managers have been afforded by states
have only grown stronger.
70
4.  States Imposed Antitakeover Rules on Shareholders
States could have taken the approach of making it easier for companies to have
takeover protections should shareholders approve.  This approach would likely have
pleased state competition advocates who often place great emphasis on the
importance of permitting shareholders to choose the legal regime that governs the
corporation in which they invest.  States, however, have almost universally shunned
this approach.
In the takeover context, shareholders did not appear interested or willing to
restrict takeovers much beyond arrangements needed for eliminating the pressure to
tender.  Despite this, Delaware, along with other states, imposed its antitakeover
arrangements on shareholders ex post in a way that left them little choice.
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(i)  The Imposition of Legislative Antitakeover Protections
Consider the antitakeover statute adopted by Delaware.
71  Tellingly, Delaware
did not do follow its earlier approach concerning limitations on directors’ liability.
In the aftermath of Smith v. Von Gorkom,
72 Delaware changed its corporate code so as
to allow companies to adopt charter provisions that limit directors’ liability.
73  In
contrast, shareholders were not given the option of adopting the antitakeover
protections contained in Delaware’s “business combination” statute by approving a
charter provision to that effect.  Instead, the Delaware statute afforded managers these
protections unless the corporation opts out of it by charter amendment.  Why did
Delaware adopt opt-in limitations on liability but opt-out limitations on takeovers?
The difference between opt-in and opt-out is of critical significance.  This is
because a charter amendment must be brought to a shareholder vote.  As a result,
shareholders cannot opt out of the Delaware statute unless the directors want this to
happen.
74  And since managers generally prefer to have antitakeover protection, there
is no reason for them to opt-out.  In short, the Delaware takeover statute has followed
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an enabling approach for the managers, not the shareholders---it’s the managers who
can have an antitakeover arrangement if they want it (which they generally do).
75
Most states have adopted a similar approach in deciding not to condition
legislative antitakeover protections on shareholder consent.
76  Indeed, some states do
not even allow for opting-out of their takeover statute (such as Wisconsin’s
antitakeover statute Judge Easterbrook confronted in  Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir)).  But practically, the difference
between allowing opting-out and not allowing opting-out is usually not all that
significant.  As long as managers control the opting-out process, we are often going to
have the antitakeover arrangement preferred by managers regardless of shareholders’
interests.
(ii)  The Imposition of Poison Pills
The introduction of more and more potent poison pills, and their approval by
Delaware courts and the courts of other states, has changed the landscape of
takeovers.  Poison pills have altered fundamentally the allocation of power between
managers and shareholders.
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What poison pills did was use the formal power that managers have to issue
securities.  This power was originally given to facilitate the raising of capital.
77  The
creators of the poison pill, however, used this power to design securities not with a
view to raising capital but rather with the sole purpose of preventing acquisitions
managers wish to block.
There is no question that the introduction of poison pills in the 80s could not
have been anticipated in the 1970s, 1960s, or 50s.  It took huge managerial demand
for antitakeover protection, coupled with the creative legal ingenuity of Martin Lipton
and his colleagues, for poison pills to be invented and implemented on a widespread
basis.  Shareholders buying shares in Delaware companies earlier on simply could not
have anticipated poison pills and the reallocation of power they would cause.
And a drastic reallocation it is indeed.  As long as they are not redeemed by
managers, poison pills typically prevent shareholders from having access to an offer.
For this reason, they have had a dramatic effect on the takeover picture and the
division of power between shareholders and managers.
Our point here is not that this reallocation is necessarily bad.  Let’s grant for a
moment that it might be beneficial to shareholders.  The important point is that this
was a major reallocation, which had not been anticipated earlier.  If states wanted to
ensure that this was in shareholders’ interests and not just in managers’ interests, they
would have required that this reallocation of power first enjoy shareholder consent.
                                                                
77  8 Del. Code s 157 states that:
Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every corporation may create
and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue and sale of any shares of stock or other
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Shareholder consent could have been required in any number of ways.  Courts
developing the doctrines governing the use of the poison pill could have required,
given the inherent conflict of interest, that pills be ratified by the shareholders either
right away or within a certain period of time.  Or a court could have required
managers to redeem a pill when shareholders express a clear preference for them to
do so---say, by tendering en masse to a non-coercive bid.  Or, at the minimum, courts
could, in such circumstances, have required the managers to carry a heavier burden of
demonstrating in a meaningful way the benefits of maintaining the pill.  Similarly,
state corporate statutes could have been amended to condition the use of poison pills
on the adoption of a charter provision allowing managers to do so.
But this is not what Delaware and other states have done.  Delaware has
imposed on the shareholders of Delaware corporations an arrangement whereby
managers enjoy a much greater level of protection from takeovers than they had
before without requiring shareholders’ consent or giving them some practical way of
getting out of an undesired arrangement.
This is all consistent with the mid-stream problem discussed in Part I.
78
Delaware cares a great deal not only about new incorporations but also about
maintaining the large stock of companies it currently has.  Managers play a crucial
role in how successful Delaware is in maintaining its current position.  The need to
satisfy the preferences of managers of existing chartered corporations has proved to
be an important force in the development of Delaware’s law.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class or classes, such rights or options to be
evidenced by or in such instrument or instruments as shall be approved by the board of directors.37
B.  The Pro-Uncertainty Tilt of Delaware Antitakeover Law
Besides predicting that states will tend to adopt corporate rules whose
substantive content benefits shareholders, the pro-state competition position also
entails that these rules would likely be formulated in a way that similarly maximizes
shareholder wealth.  Roberta Romano, one of the strongest supporters of state
competition, suggested in her earlier writings that one of the advantages of Delaware
law is its certainty and predictability.
79  It is important to realize that this dimension is
not the same as where the law stands substantively.  For example, a body of law can
restrict takeovers greatly in either a predictable or fuzzy way.  And, similarly, if the
law is permissive, this can again be done in a predictable or fuzzy way.  That is, one
dimension is roughly where the line is drawn, and the other dimension is how clearly
that line is drawn.
Other things being equal, predictability is desirable.  It reduces uncertainty and
the amount of litigation.  It is for these reasons that Romano viewed it as a virtue and
suggested that Delaware law’s certainty and predictability has enabled it to remain
dominant in the competition for corporate charters despite widespread copying of
Delaware law by other states.
80   The problem, however, is that Delaware law does
not enjoy this virtue of predictability and certainty.  Delaware courts have
consistently filled Delaware jurisprudence with principles that are open-ended and
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80 See 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. at 226.38
unclear.
81  The principles throughout Delaware law contain  terms which call for a
case-specific assessment by the court.  Moreover, there is always some room for the
chancery court’s equitable intervention.  Any plaintiffs’ lawyer knows that it would
be difficult to attack successfully a freezeout or to get a derivative suit to pass the test
formulated in Aronson v. Lewis.
82  But the outcome is never certain.
There are reasons to believe that this is no accident.  Delaware might
purposely be maintaining a legal regime that encourages litigation.
83  Delaware’s
corporate lawyers, an important interest group in Delaware, benefit from more, rather
than less, litigation.  Thus, regardless of where Delaware law stands substantively,
Delaware has an incentive and, consequently, the tendency to draw the line in a way
that is more fuzzy and litigation-inducing, than what would be good for shareholders.
The pro-uncertainty tilt of Delaware’s takeover law is as apparent as it is in
other areas.  Delaware could have given managers a great deal of power to “just say
no” while circumscribing very clearly the boundaries of what managers can and
cannot do.  But, no, Delaware has chosen to do it in a way that leaves a fair amount of
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uncertainty as to where exactly the line is drawn.
84  Characteristically of Delaware,
the court’s requirement of a very case-specific investigation, always keeps the door
open, at least a bit, to judicial intervention.
85  It is no coincidence how frequently
takeovers result in litigation.
C.  Comparison to the British City Code
We would like to end our observations on state takeover law by comparing it
to the regulatory arrangement created by Britain’s City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers.
86   British regulation of takeovers is interesting because it is basically in the
hands of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, a nongovernmental body, which
administers and revises the City Code.  The City Code and its implementation  is an
example of a system of regulation that is not imposed from the outside by a detached
governmental body but rather by a group that has strong connections to interested
parties.  The chair of the panel is chosen by the Bank of England with other members
representing such groups as the insurance industry, pension funds, investment banks,
clearing houses, British industry and the London Exchange.
87
The British City Code contains a body of arrangements that is very different
from U.S. state takeover law when measured along the two dimensions the earlier
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discussion has focussed on---the extent to which regulatory arrangements protect
managers, and the extent to which they generate confusion and litigation due to a lack
of clarity.
On the first dimension, the City Code differs sharply from U.S. state takeover
law on managerial defensive tactics.  In particular, the Code contains a sweeping
prohibition on defensive tactics unless shareholder consent is obtained.  General
Principle seven of the City Code states that
At no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to the board
of the offeree company, or after the board of the offeree company has
reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, may  any
action be taken by the board of the offeree company in relation to the
affairs of the company, without the approval of the shareholders in
general meeting, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer
being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to
decide on its merits.
88
This general prohibition is reflected in Rule 21 of the City Code, which specifically
prohibits a target board from engaging in a list of certain defensive tactics without
shareholder approval
89---a list which the Panel has made clear is not exhaustive.
90
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It is not the case that the City Code ignores the problems that takeovers might
pose.  To prevent the possible pressure to tender problem, the Code provides that, if
an offer is successful, non-tendering shareholders will get a second opportunity to
tender,
91 much like state “redemption rights” statutes. But given that it’s possible to
enable shareholders to make an undistorted choice by having such an arrangement,
the Code does not leave any room for defensive tactics.
Turning to the certainty/uncertainty dimension, the British regulatory
arrangement seems to provide more certainty and less room for litigation than those
under state law.  The clear prohibition on the use of defensive tactics contained in the
City Code is one such example.  It is not a “flexible” balancing test tailor-made for
endless litigation.
92  Indeed, a major concern of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers,
as well as others involved in London’s financial markets, is that the European Union
might pass takeover regulation that will enable targets to engage in strategic takeover
litigation so common in the United States and so rare in Great Britain.
93
The reasons why the Code went in such a different direction might lie in the
different incentives its designers had from those who crafted U.S. state takeover law.
Presumably those responsible for the City Code gave less weight to managerial
interests because of the close connection at least some of them had with the interests
of shareholders.  Moreover, corporate managers operating in a federal system such as
the United States have significantly more influence as they can reward states that
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cater to their interests and punish those that do not through their incorporation and
reincorporation decisions.
The British regulatory system is an example of a national system of regulation
that both addresses possible defects in the takeover process and ensures that
shareholders, not management, have the ultimate say on whether a takeover
proceeds.  It accomplishes this without the degree of uncertainty and pervasive
takeover litigation that characterizes U.S.  state takeover regulation.  The British
experience suggests that the federalist structure of corporate law might not be as
powerful a force for desirable corporate rules as some pro-state competition
advocates contend.
III.  TAKEOVER LAW AND THE SUPPORTERS OF STATE COMPETITION
So far we have argued that state takeover law is consistent with the theory of
state competition, outlined in Part I, which views such competition as problematic.
We now make our point in another way---by showing how supporters of state
competition are unable to square their position on state competition with their views
on the type of takeover regulation that maximizes shareholder value.
As will become clear, the leading advocates of state competition are also
vigorous supporters of a robust market for corporate control.  As a result, there is a
deep tension in their views.  We begin, in Section A, by analyzing the reasoning of
four prominent proponents of state competition and how they try to reconcile their
respective positions on state competition and takeovers.  In Section B, we will argue43
that their attempts at reconciling these two positions are unconvincing.  We suggest
that a more productive path would be for them to reconsider their position on state
competition in light of their own arguments concerning the substantial benefits
takeovers can create for shareholders.
A.  The Dilemma Facing Supporters of State Competition
The most prominent supporters of state competition---Ralph Winter, Frank
Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel and Roberta Romano---also simultaneously advocate a
legal regime that facilitates, rather than frustrates, takeovers.  The hostility of state
law to takeovers, therefore, poses a serious problem.  What would explain the poor
record of states in the takeover area without undermining their general position on
state competition?  Assessing how successful they are in reconciling their facially
inconsistent positions will go a long way in determining how convincing their views
are on the desirability of state competition.  Accordingly, we will examine these pro-
state competition scholars’ arguments.
1.  Ralph Winter
Ralph Winter formulated the classic response to Cary’s contention that state
competition results in a “race for the bottom” that harms shareholders.
94  He built his
critique on the observation that a corporation chartered in a state with an inefficient
                                                                
94 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. Legal Studies 251, 256 (1977).44
corporate code will have a lower rate of return on investment as a result.
95
Companies with sub-par rates of return will have greater difficulty raising capital,
96
have less success in the product market,
97 and be more likely to be the target of a
takeover.
98  The consequences of inferior returns created by inefficient corporate rules
reduce managers’ private benefits of control, including their job security.
99
Managers, accordingly, have a strong incentive to ensure that the legal regime
governing the operations of their corporation result in shareholders receiving the
greatest possible return on their investment.  In other words, in  Winter’s view,
managers will maximize shareholder value out of self-interest.
100
At the same time, however, Winter expressed his general belief that a regime
that facilitated takeovers maximized corporate profits.
101  Profit-maximization is
obviously what shareholders, as residual claimants, typically want.  Not surprisingly,
he was critical of state antitakeover statutes and, indeed, attributed part of the high
cost of takeovers to the comparatively regulatory light-handed federal law (the
Williams Act
102) regulating tender offers.  There was much for Winter to object to.
Some “first-generation” state antitakeover statutes went so far as to prevent
acquisitions of companies, which had their principle place of business in the state,
unless a state official approved it.
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In explaining how existing state antitakeover law, which he disapproved of
based on its effect on shareholder wealth, was consistent with his defense of state
competition, Winter made several points---points that, as we shall see, have often
been repeated by others.  He stressed that Delaware’s antitakeover statute, by far the
most important state statute on the subject, was relatively innocuous.
103  More
importantly, Winter claimed that whether federal regulation was appropriate in the
takeover context was an issue “quite different” from the arguments raised by Cary.
104
Since existing state antitakeover statutes typically had extraterritorial application---
they applied to companies even if they were not chartered in the state---these laws,
accordingly, implicated a “chartering issue in only a peripheral sense.”
105  Indeed, the
extraterritorial features of antitakeover statutes,  Winter believed, substantiated his
basic contention that states competing for corporate charters have strong incentives to
provide efficient corporate rules.
106
This last explanation, based on state antitakeover statutes’ extraterritorial
application, is obviously inadequate to explain the reaction of states to the Supreme
Court’s decision in MITE,
107 which called into serious question the constitutionality
of these statutes.  After this decision, the vast majority of states, including Delaware,
quickly passed new antitakeover legislation that was confined to companies chartered
in the state.  State antitakeover law, as a result, can no longer be cabined from the rest
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of state corporate law in the way that Winter suggested.  On the other hand, his other
two arguments---that state antitakeover law somehow raised different issues than
other aspects of corporate law and the reliance on Delaware’s regulatory light-touch--
-are ones that remain popular to this day with pro-state competition scholars.
2.  Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are also strong, even passionate,
believers in state competition for corporate charters.  Thus, in their academic work,
they presume that doctrines produced by state competition are efficient.
108  However,
like Winter, they are vigorous supporters of takeovers and, as a result, strongly
oppose the use of any and all defensive tactics by target management,
109  because
regulation that allows managers to impede takeovers is unjustified and socially
wasteful.
The inconsistency in their position is even more obvious than was the case
with  Winter.  Easterbrook and Fischel have consistently argued, over a period of
some fifteen years in numerous articles, that state competition generally produces
efficient corporate rules.
110  Yet on this important issue state competition produces the
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opposite of what they strongly believe are desirable legal arrangements.  To their
credit, they candidly acknowledge the problem state antitakeover legislation creates
for their position, describing it as “embarrassing.”
111  The dilemma they face is
painfully reflected in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,
112 where
Judge Easterbrook, while considering the constitutionality of a state antitakeover
statute, forthrightly acknowledged the tension between his belief in both state
competition and the folly of antitakeover regulation.
However, Easterbrook and Fischel, at the end of the day, are only willing to
concede that state antitakeover regulation reveals that state competition is not perfect.
State competition, they argue, creates efficient rules over a period of time.  We must
be patient and recognize that the “long run takes time to arrive.”
113 They identify the
shortcoming in state competition, at least in the short-run, with respect to takeover
legislation as this: states that adopt antitakeover laws are not penalized as much as
perhaps they should be by competition from other states as investors will realize that
any state can pass antitakeover legislation mid-stream.
114  State antitakeover law, we
are assured, is a “special,” although important, case.
115
Like  Winter before them, Easterbrook and Fischel point to Delaware’s
antitakeover statute.  They stress that it is relatively mild compared to those of other
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states.
116  This is used to substantiate the assertion that state competition, even in the
takeover context, creates powerful incentives for states to enact efficient regulation.
3.  Roberta Romano
Roberta Romano is another leading supporter of state competition.  While
avoiding taking a stand on the issue in her initial writings, she now characterizes state
competition for corporate charters as the “genius of American Corporate Law.”
117
Her belief in state competition is as strong  as anyone’s.  Indeed, she has recently
argued that securities law should be recast, based on the American corporate law
model, so as to allow competition between chartering jurisdictions.
118
Also, like Winter, Easterbrook and Fischel, Romano views legal arrangements
enabling managers to erect antitakeover defenses as inefficient.
119  She acknowledges
the “dismal track records of most states in takeover regulation.”
120  Is Romano any
more successful in resolving the conflict?
In the course of defending the consistency of her position, Romano
emphasizes that Delaware has been slow to adopt antitakeover legislation, even
though it typically has been a leader in most major corporate law reforms.  Moreover,
its antitakeover statute is not as draconian as other states, such as Pennsylvania’s
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disgorgement statute.
121  Furthermore, Romano spends a great deal of time arguing
that, whatever the imperfections of state regulation, any federal takeover law is likely
to be worse.
This last defense is hardly a ringing endorsement of state competition.  Rather
than showing the “genius” of American Corporate law, it is rather an argument that
we must live in a highly imperfect world.  We find it hard to imagine that Romano, or
indeed the other pro-state competition scholars we have discussed, would oppose a
hypothetical federal statute that sharply limited the ability of states to restrict
takeovers.  Whether this is a realistic possibility is besides the point.  Support for such
a statute would underline the fact that state competition suffers from serious
shortcomings.  What, if anything, should be done about these shortcomings is another
analytical question.
B.  Why Supporters of State Competition Should Reconsider
One type of reaction by state competition supporters, as we have seen, views
state takeover law as an anomaly, an exception, or an imperfection.  This is most
explicit in Easterbrook and Fischel’s writings.  The sentiment here seems to be that
even a process that has strong structural reasons to function well can fail from time to
time, and these failures do not imply that the process is not a good one.
But it is not clear that one can brush aside takeover law as an anomaly or an
isolated failure, and comfortably continue to believe that state competition is such a
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great process.  To start with, takeovers might well have been the most important issue
with respect to which state corporate law has had to develop a position in the last
twenty years.
If states have produced bad takeover law, this was not a fluke, a one-time
isolated mistake.  We are talking about a gradual process developing over quite a few
years, in many steps and decisions and with much attention and occupation by state
officials along the way.  There were several waves of antitakeover statutes,
122 all
representing the persistent attempts by states to place impediments in front of
takeovers with little or no support in the academic literature.  And as for judicial
decisions, this involved not one case, but rather an issue that has been visited and
revisited over many years.  If state competition has persistently produced bad, even
indefensible, results concerning the most important corporate issue of recent times,
how can we be confident that it performs well elsewhere?
All this means is that it is hard to brush this away as an anomalous exception
and continue to think state competition can reliably produce good results.
Easterbrook and Fischel’s explanation of why states have adopted inefficient takeover
legislation, the fact that these were mid-stream legislative changes,
123 is in no way
limited to takeovers.  Mid-stream changes are possible with respect to any legal rule,
not just takeover regulation, that managers might wish to change.  Moreover, mid-
stream changes are not only possible through a state changing its corporate code, due,
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say, to campaign contributions, but by a corporation reincorporating to another state
as well.
Another common reaction by supporters of state competition is to point out
that Delaware has not been as extreme as some other states in its antitakeover statute.
This is true.  But through case law, and in particular the approval of the poison pill,
Delaware has erected formidable barriers to takeovers.  Delaware’s antitakeover
position has had, as it typically does, a central and very influential role.  The use of
poison pills is now very widespread.  The debate is over the body of law produced by
state competition.  And while states differ somewhat in the extent to which they
restrict takeovers, they all by and large go much further in that direction than Winter,
Easterbrook, Fischel, and Romano would approve of.
While the pro-state competition view has a serious problem accounting for
existing state takeover law, needing to rely on excuses and anomalies, the view that
Cary held, and that we are advocating, has no problem whatsoever explaining this.
Our concern with the possible shortcomings of state competition for corporate
charters is not only consistent with the state takeover law that we observe but helps
explain why state law has evolved in the regrettable direction that it has.  By
reconsidering their largely unqualified endorsement of state competition, supporters
of state competition can gain both a better explanation of why states have adopted
restrictive takeover rules and retain their belief in the efficiency of a more permissive
legal arrangement.52
IV.  CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to highlight the problems involved in state competition
for corporate charters.  On some important issues, states might have incentives to
provide rules that are attractive to managers but not shareholders.  Takeover law is
one important area in which state competition might well have produced a body of
law that excessively restricts takeovers.  Takeover law is one important area in which
state competition is likely to fail.  There are strong theoretical reasons to expect that
state competition will work to produce a body of corporate law that excessively
protects incumbent managers.  The development of state takeover law, we have
argued, is consistent with this view.  It should lead the many who offer unqualified
support for state competition to reassess their position.